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Introduction
Societies that undergo civil armed conflict and remain one state must come to terms with
a history that has impacted the nation as a whole. Unlike wars fought on foreign soil, civil wars
are deeply traumatic to the national group identity and inherently fracture the nation. In cases
that have a decisive victor (such as Franco after the Spanish civil war, or Pinochet after Chile’s
internal strife) the winners have the privilege of constructing, communicating, and enforcing a
narrative of the conflict. This historical narrative often does not acknowledge the experiences of
the vanquished, and enforces an artificial consensus that does not allow for true reconciliation or
national healing.
But what happens in a case where the peace is brokered, and all sides are recognized as
re-constructors of civil society? El Salvador’s peace accord, brokered by the United Nations,
stipulated that all forces would disarm and that the FMLN guerrilla organization would become a
political party. No one was declared a victor, and all sides were equal partners in the
development of a democratic post-war society. Because of this inclusive approach to
establishing peace, many sectors of society were involved in the process. Though everyone was
left somewhat unsatisfied with the provisions of the accord, the long and arduous peace process
did lead to an opening of society with the warring factions left somewhat intact. Today the
Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) and Alianza Republicana
Nacionalista de El Salvador(ARENA) political parties continue to fight for their goals through
political means.
Unlike the Spanish or Chilean cases where a narrative of history was imposed, no one
Salvadoran group was entitled to the privilege of writing history. For this reason, multiple
narratives of the conflict still exist and are perpetuated by political parties, institutions, and
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private groups who vie for eventual recognition in official history. Nearly 20 years after the end
of the conflict, the tension over history is salient and can be seen in the various articulations and
attempts to preserve competing narratives of the war, particularly through monuments and
museums, discussed here as “sites of memory.”
I argue that the manner in which the conflict ended allowed for a unique historical
process to begin that allows for particular moments and historical figures to be remembered and
mythologized, either in a polarizing or a unifying way. Some events and historical people are
understood in multiple, competing ways that show no sign of a possible reconciliation, while
others are gradually emerging as the possible beginnings of a unified national narrative about the
civil conflict. This process can be seen particularly in the claiming of public spaces, through
monuments, memorials, street names, and commemorative events that either foster partisanship
or attempt to bring Salvadoran society together.
In my thesis, I will first discuss two figures that are irreconcilably polarizing (Chapter 2),
followed by a discussion of two figures who show the potential to unify the nation (Chapter 3).
Each section will examine how these figures exemplify either the enduring fracturization or
emerging unification of Salvadoran society. I examine the narratives surrounding these wartime figures to understand the degree to which their mythologies are consistent or divergent. Do
people from across the political spectrum describe them in the same way? If not, what sorts of
parallel narratives exists, and can these be attributed to political differences? And finally, is
there hope that someday a unified and unifying historical narrative will emerge to help future
generations make sense of their violent history? Each of the four examples discussed here has
undergone a process of mythification by various sectors of society in the nineteen years since the
end of the war, with different results at the present time. What they have in common is that they

4

reside in the collective Salvadoran memory, and are invoked for the purposes of present-day
politicians, religious leaders, and military officials (as well as everyday folks) to make sense of
the internal violence that ended fewer than two decades ago.
In Chapter 2, I will address polarizing narratives of history as exemplified by the
competing mythologies surrounding Colonel Domingo Monterrosa (1940-1984) and Major
Roberto D’Aubuisson (1944-1992). Though there are undoubtedly other moments and people
about whom competing narratives are constructed and proliferated in El Salvador, these two
emerged in my research as salient examples of people who are too important to be forgotten, but
too polarizing to be reconciled.
Chapter 3 discusses two examples of potentially unifying people: the unifying mythology
of Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero (1917-1980) and the tumultuous but increasingly accepted
mythology surrounding the recently deceased FMLN commander and politician, Schafik Jorge
Handal (1930-2006). Though of course there are critics of these examples, I argue that there are
few other figures that are emerging as possible bridges of reconciliation and understanding.
Overall, Salvadoran society is still deeply fractured, but these examples offer a glimpse of what
could lie ahead as the conflict drifts further into the past.
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Chapter 1
Background Information: History, Theory, and Methods
History
During the 1980s, the armed conflict in El Salvador turned the international spotlight on
one of the world’s smallest nations, a country long characterized by violent uprisings and
military repression. The Salvadoran Civil War, which, by most accounts, lasted from 1980 until
1992, was the culmination of more than a century of acute social and economic inequality. In El
Salvador, the structures of power put in place during its time as a Spanish colony hardly changed
for centuries. Land and wealth were concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy families,
commonly referred to as the oligarquía (oligarchy), who privatized collective indigenous land in
order to construct a semi-feudal coffee empire beginning in the late 1880s. Though the specific
practices utilized to ensure social and economic hegemony of landholders (mostly of European
descent), inequality rooted in the colonial social structure “was perpetrated well into the
twentieth century by the landed oligarchy, with the assistance of the military.”1 A series of
military dictatorships with close ties to these ruling families maintained order and met opposition
with severe repression and violence for over a century.
Between independence and the 1880s, indigenous people had, on the whole, maintained
control over communal land. In the 1860s and -70s, the government had even formalized
community land management, calling these lands “ejidos,” and documenting their locations. It
was only at the end of this century that the government developed stricter property laws in order
to shift towards a system that privileged private property, specifically for coffee growers. In
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Richard A. Haggerty, “Historical Setting,” in El Salvador: A Country Study, ed. Federal Research Division of the
Library of Congress (Washington, DC: United States Government, 1990), 11.
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1881, communal lands were “exterminated” through a legislative decree.2 Some of the
indigenous people were given small parcels of land by the government in exchange for their
labor on the ever-expanding coffee plantations, while others were forced north to less arable
land, or to cities to look for work in industrial sectors. This led to the phenomenon of internal
seasonal migration, fueled by those campesinos who could just barely subsist on their parcels of
land, and had to work on plantations during planting and harvesting seasons in order to make
ends meet. This allowed coffee to dominate the market further, and by the turn of the twentieth
century, it made up 76% of El Salvador’s exports.3 The coffee industry propelled an oligarchy
composed of a handful of families into positions as players in the global economic system. This
group of landowners is popularly referred to in El Salvador as the “fourteen families,” (as I saw
repeatedly in my interviews), though the actual number of powerful families was closer to
thirty.4 This ruling class developed at the expense of the millions who worked the land. Rural
peasants, or campesinos, worked for a modern equivalent of 50 cents a day under harsh
conditions and without the possibility of upward mobility.5
This pattern of land distribution, termed a “system of exclusion” by L.M. Ladutke,6
prevailed for the next hundred years. The displaced and undermined indigenous and mestizo
(mixed-race) communities continued to be exploited, while the military and the government
preserved and protected the coffee-growers’ economic interests. Between the 1880s and 1970s,
an unprecedented alliance developed between the landholding oligarchy, the political elite, and
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Spanish, Ministerio de Educación, Historia de El Salvador: Tomo II (San Salvador: Comisión Nacional de los
Libros de Texto Gratuitos, 1994), 11.
3
Spanish, Michael Krämer, El Salvador: Unicornio de la Memoria (San Salvador: Museo de la Palabra y la Imagen,
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Spanish, Film. 1932: Cicatriz de la memoria.
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Spanish, Film. 1932: Cicatriz de la memoria.
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L.M. Ladutke, Freedom of Expression in El Salvador: The Struggle for Human Rights and Democracy (London:
McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2004).
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the military. These three institutions crystallized their grip on power through intermarriage and
routinely exhibited forceful action as the means of upholding the status quo.7
The only meaningful challenge to the dominant power structure came in January of 1932
when the worldwide economic depression of the early 1930s drove down coffee prices by 54%
and “privation among the rural labor force, long a tolerated fact of life, sank to previously
unknown depths.”8 As the standard of living plummeted among the working class in the early
1930s, the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES) began to garner support, thanks to a network
of university students and leaders of various agricultural communities. With coffee prices at an
all-time low and land reform further out of reach than ever before, leaders of the Communist
Party covertly organized a uprising of coffee workers. Across the main coffee-growing regions,
hundreds of coffee workers under the leadership of Farabundo Martí, Feliciano Ama and others
raided barracks and took up arms to in the name of revolution.9 In response to this armed revolt,
the government of General Martínez Hernández sent out the National Guard, and with the help
of local militias put down the rebellion. Within three days the armed forces had achieved their
goal, but at the human cost of between 10,000 and 30,000 lives, nearly all of these indigenous
males.10 Richard A. Haggerty describes the legacy of silence that resulted from the massacre:
No matter what figure one accepts, the reprisals were highly disproportionate to
the effects of the communist-inspired insurgency, which produced no more than
thirty civilian fatalities. The widespread executions of campesinos, mainly
Indians, apparently were intended to demonstrate to the rural population that the
military was now in control… and the memory of la matanza would linger over
Salvadoran political life for decades, deterring dissent and maintaining a sort of
coerced conformity.11
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Jeffrey M. Paige, “Coffee and Power in El Salvador.” Latin American Research Review 28:3 (1993): 9.
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Spanish. Equipo de Educación MAIZ, Historia de El Salvador: de Como los Guanacos no Sucumbieron a los
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Though this event happened decades before the Salvadoran civil war broke out, it is an important
precursor to the armed conflict because it was the nation’s most dramatic example of the lengths
to which the ruling classes would go to preserve their absolute dominance. The silencing of
these voices served as a strong warning that resistance would be met by mass coercion and
repression. This fostered a culture of fear and silence that resulted in three decades of stable
military dictatorship.
During the 1970s, the agitation for land reform and for fair elections mobilized increasing
numbers of the population to take part in protests, boycotts, and other (usually) non-violent
means of resistance.12 Because of widespread poverty and growing discontent, the ruling class
organized elections in 1972, but these were fraudulent, and did little to appease popular
disillusionment. As White describes: “El Salvador’s dance with democracy ended in 1972 with
the stolen elections that maintained power in the hands of the elites while further marginalizing
the poor majority as well as most reformers.”13
The 1960s and 1970s were also a crucial time in the history of the Catholic Church, both
internationally and within El Salvador. It was a time of sweeping changes that recognized the
importance of marginalized communities, such as the Vatican II conference, and the promotion
of Liberation Theology. Liberation Theology interpreted the gospel through the lens of
preferential treatment for the poor. In the Catholic Church across Latin America, clergy and lay
people alike “began to take their social mission seriously: lay persons committed themselves to
work among the poor, charismatic bishops and priests encouraged the calls for progress and
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Rex A. Hudson, “National Security” in El Salvador: A Country Study, ed. Federal Research Division of the
Library of Congress (Washington, DC: United States Government, 1990), 239.
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Christopher M. White, The History of El Salvador (London: Greenwood Press, 2009), 80.
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national modernization.”14 In El Salvador, the progressive or liberationist wing of the Catholic
Church began establishing Comunidades Eclesiásticas de Base (Christian Base Communities or
CEBs). This network of grassroots organizations aimed to awaken and nurture class
consciousness and activism among El Salvador’s marginalized people by preaching Biblical
preference for the poor.15
Efforts to educate and organize the masses incurred the wrath of the ruling class in the
form of unofficial repression from the right-wing militias, otherwise known as the “death
squads.” These groups were apparently supported financially by the oligarchy and drew on
active-duty and former military personnel for their members. The squads assassinated targeted
clergy members, activists, and other “subversives” in an effort to discourage further antigovernment activities and to deter potential expansion of the ranks of the mass organizations and
other protest groups.16
The ongoing repression also sparked the formation of armed revolutionary guerrilla
groups that split off from the Communist Party (PCES). The PCES had existed clandestinely
since the 1932 massacre, and stood for worker’s rights and the eradication of poverty. However,
in the 1970s the PCES was advocating for a peaceful, democratic route to reform via democratic
politics, not armed insurgency, and various groups began to break off from each other in pursuit
of revolution. The largest of these were the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) and the
Fuerzas Populares de Liberación (FPL). Over time, other smaller organizations also splintered
off from the FPL and the ERP: the Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional (RN), and the
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Leonardo and Clodovis Boff, A Concise History of Liberation Theology http://www.landreform.org/boff2.htm
(October 23, 2010).
15
Haggerty, 31.
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Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centroamericanos (PRTC).17 The guerrilla groups
began terrorist-style activities such as planting bombs in government buildings, and galvanized
young people to join la lucha.
Inspired by the 1979 Sandinista victory in neighboring Nicaragua, Cuban leader Fidel
Castro urged reconciliation between the four armed groups and the Communist Party, and
organized talks in Havana. In 1980, the four main revolutionary factions (ERP, FPL, FARN, and
PRTC), as well as the PCES, joined forces to form the Frente Farabundo Martí para la
Liberación Nacional (FMLN).18 They named their organization after Farabundo Martí, the most
prominent leader of the 1932 coffee worker revolt. In doing so, the leaders of the FMLN
invoked the historical memory of a traumatic event and recast it as the first battle in their armed
revolution. Though these organizations promoted different leftist frameworks and ideas about
what guerrilla tactics would work best, they united in the face of common enemies: the
weakened state, the coffee oligarchy, and the emboldened military, which more often than not
protected the interests of the oligarchy rather than the state.
The cycle of violence and repression escalated and reached a dramatic apex in March
1980 with the assassination of the archbishop of San Salvador, Oscar Arnulfo Romero. Romero,
who had been selected as archbishop in part because of his moderate political views, was
influenced strongly by the liberation theology movement, and he was appalled by the brutality
employed with increasing frequency by government forces against the populace and particularly
against clergy. In his weekly radio homilies, he related statistics on political assassination and
excesses committed by the military. He frequently urged soldiers to refuse to carry out what he
characterized as immoral orders. His high profile made him an important political figure, and he

17
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used his influence to argue against United States military aid to El Salvador. Despite his stature
as the country's primary Catholic leader, he was targeted for assassination; all factors indicate
that the killing was carried out by members of the right-wing death squads, and was most likely
ordered by prominent politician and military officer Major Roberto d’Aubuisson.19 However,
the case was never fully investigated or conclusively solved.
The conflict escalated into a full-fledged civil war once the FMLN became a unified
entity, and launched an offensive in the capital in January 1981. Though the FMLN offensive
failed on several fronts, they retained certain military strongholds and focused increasing
international attention on El Salvador. That same year they managed to assemble the resources to
launch a guerrilla radio station, Radio Venceremos, from the mountains of the department of
Morazán, and broadcast nationally to galvanize support. They used a variety of guerrilla
strategies from destroying infrastructure, to kidnapping foreign businessmen and local
politicians, and fighting in the most geographically difficult regions of El Salvador.20
On the other side, the United States gradually invested more and more into counterinsurgency efforts and, by the height of the war, was providing more than a million dollars a day
in military and economic aid to El Salvador’s government, as well as military training and
technology. The U.S. leadership saw the conflicts in Central America as the front line of the
Cold War, and spared no available expense. Since both Cuba and Nicaragua openly backed the
FMLN, the Reagan Administration considered the Salvadoran guerrilla movement to be part of
the expanding threat of Communism in Latin America.21 U.S. aid effectively prolonged the war
and embarrassed both the American and Salvadoran militaries, since the armed forces far
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John Pike, El Salvador: Civil War http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/elsalvador2.htm (November
20, 2010).
20
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Haggerty, 42.
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exceeded the guerrillas in both training and technology, but were not able to win a military
victory.
Also, by 1981, Salvadoran conservatives had became so dissatisfied with the existing
parties that they created a new one, under the leadership of Major Roberto d’Aubuisson. They
called it the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista de El Salvador, (Nationalist Republican Alliance
of El Salvador, or ARENA).22 Though presidential, municipal, and congressional elections took
place at different times during the war, they were affected by fraud and voter boycotts, and thus
are not often credited as being fair or representative. However, ARENA as a party survived the
war, and had its presidential candidates elected in four consecutive elections (1989, 1994, 1999,
and 2004) that were internationally recognized as fair and free.
During the conflict more than 70,000 people were killed or disappeared, and the public
demand for a resolution to the conflict escalated in 1989 with the launch of the final FMLN
offensive in November, in which the guerrillas won over new strongholds in the capital city of
San Salvador. During the offensive, six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter were
murdered in the middle of the night at the Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas. At
first, the government and military blamed their deaths on the FMLN. However, international
investigations revealed that indeed the priests, five of them of Spanish origin, were assassinated
by the elite Atlacatl military battalion during the offensive.23 Their murders not only increased
pressure within El Salvador for a resolution to the conflict, but also mounted additional
international pressure to cease the violence and end human rights abuses, particularly those
inflicted on foreign nationals.
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Historia del Mayor Roberto d’Aubuisson, http://www.arena.org.sv/historia.php (December 1, 2010).
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For the next three years, the United Nations brokered negotiations between the FMLN
leadership, the government and the military, and on January 16, 1992 the Chapultepec accords
were signed. Its main stipulations included a 70% reduction and repurposing of the armed
forces, the formation of completely new civilian police force, legal amnesty for war related
crimes, and the disarmament of the FMLN in order for it to become a political party rather than
an armed group.24 The Salvadoran peace accords are considered to be among the most
comprehensive and effective in the world, as they have largely been implemented and there has
been a drastic reduction in human rights abuses .
As one scholar of Salvadoran history writes, “while the nation had passed through
repeated cycles of liberalization and repression, Salvadorans had never had a truly democratic
form of government prior to the 1992 peace accords.”25 Today, that same party which originally
grew out of the armed revolutionary struggle won the presidency in the historic elections of
2009. The election of Mauricio Funes, a former journalist, marked the first peaceful democratic
transition between the two dominant political parties that came out of the war, ARENA who had
held the presidential office since 1989, and the FMLN.
Also, after the war ended, the leftist groups that made up the FMLN once again began
breaking apart. For the leaders who signed the peace agreements, ARENA’s presidential victory
in 1994 came as a shocking blow, as did the party’s re-election in 1999 and 2004. Over the last
twenty years, the political left has struggled to maintain unity, and the FMLN has increasingly
distanced itself from its guerrilla past, in order to become more appealing to voters. Because of
this softening of hard-line ideology, many of the FMLN’s former leaders have left the party.
Some have departed from El Salvador all together (such as the ERP’s front man Joaquín
24
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Villalobos). Others, such as Ana Guadalupe Martínez (one of my interviewees), have found a
home in smaller political parties such as the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic
Party or PDC). Still others have removed themselves entirely from politics, such as Carlos
Henríquez Consalvi, formerly the voice of Radio Venceremos who today runs a small, private
history museum in San Salvador. Most of my interviewees agree that the FMLN political party
of today is more concerned with politics than with pursuing the goals that inspired the revolution.
On the other hand, ARENA managed to consolidate the right behind a conservative, neoliberal agenda. During ARENA’s twenty years in power, El Salvador signed the Central
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and generally promoted the interests of
entrepreneurs and corporations. Today, El Salvador is home to Central America’s largest malls
and it’s best highways, the two legacies that the conservative party points to during election
seasons. However, there has been little growth in the provision of basic services such as health,
education or employment, and the gap between rich and poor has grown dramatically.26
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Theory
In my scholarly investigation about historical memory, three main theoretical ideas stood
out and ultimately impacted the direction of my research. The first is the basic theory that
history is not static, but rather interpretations of past events are constantly in flux based on the
intersection and negotiation of collective memories held and promoted by the various groups that
make up a society. Secondly, my project is influenced by the idea that collective memories are
communicated in narrative accounts that are actively and intentionally transmitted by the group
that is invested in that narrative’s preservation. Lastly, I thought extensively about the idea that
nations that have undergone collective trauma must reach a consensus about the meaning and
interpretations of past events, and that this consensus is either artificially imposed or genuinely
agreed upon over the course of time.
The critical study of history and memory in the discipline of sociology is a relatively
recent development. Maurice Halbwachs is widely accepted as the first sociologist to examine
and address history and memory in his groundbreaking 1950 work On Collective Memory.27 In
it, he posits the pivotal idea that history is shaped by the collective memories of groups and
institutions who each interpret and transmit their versions of events to the next generation. He
states that, “there are as many collective memories as there are groups and institutions in a
society… individuals, being located in a specific group context, draw on that context to
remember or recreate the past.”28 This same idea is reiterated by Peter Burke, who states that
“given the multiplicity of social identities and the co-existence of rival memories and alternative
memories, it is surely more fruitful to think in pluralistic terms about the uses of memories to
different social groups, who may well have different views about what is significant or worthy of
27
28

Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, trans. Lewis Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
Halbwachs, 22.
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memory.”29 This idea fundamentally contributed to the way I designed my project, and helped
me identify which Salvadoran groups and institutions are in a position to successfully promote
the narratives of their collective memories in the post-war era. I decided to mainly explore the
narratives of El Salvador’s two main political parties, ARENA and the FMLN (and to an extent,
the military) because they are the most prominent and powerful institutions who can influence
the narrative that is eventually communicated as history.
Later theorists corroborated the idea of history as malleable, and elaborated upon the
ways that collective memories are transmitted. In particular, Hernhard Giesen and Kay Junge’s
article “Historical Memory”30 discusses specific means through which groups transmit their
particular understandings of history. Giesen and Junge argue that historical memory “refers to
some past episode that can be recounted in a narrative format… it is only within such a narrative
frame that individual and collective identities can take form and be communicated.”31 They also
discuss two principal modes of transmitting these narratives: through intentional attempts that
serve to proactively “counteract oblivion,”32 and through non-intentional moments produced by
objects, dates and places that passively invoke the past by “intrud[ing] on our minds.”33
Intentional attempts are conducted by “social carriers of memory [who] store, imagine, and
reproduce history in the name of their respective community,”34 while passive transmission
occurs when citizens come into contact with objects or places that invoke recollections or
mythologies about the past.

29

Peter Burke, “History as a Social Memory” in Jeffrey K. Olick, ed., The Collective Memory Reader (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011), 188-192.
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The collective memories of the four figures discussed in this paper are indeed reproduced
through both of these forms of transmission. The political right and left actively seek to transmit
their respective narratives through writing books, giving political speeches, and building
monuments and museums. Because of their crucial role in constructing and transmitting
narratives of history, I sought out “social carriers of memory” such as politicians, professors and
museum curators to interview for my project. They are the ones who participate in this
intentional communication process, so I felt that getting their perspectives would give particular
insight into the intentionality of history’s construction and transmission. It is also these carriers
of memory who invest in the creation of spaces and objects that function as catalysts to passively
invoke memories and particular narratives. Objects such as monuments and street signs must be
encountered by citizens and visitors in their daily lives, and serve as reminders that are passively
absorbed by the observer.
The last main theoretical idea that framed my thinking in the development of this project
was explored by Paloma Aguilar in her analysis of collective memory in the Spanish Civil War
entitled Memory and Amnesia.35 She discusses the silencing of multiple narratives of history
under Franco, and proceeds to describe the way a national consensus of history can be built in
the wake of a collective trauma. In my work, I consider the negotiated end of the Salvadoran
Civil War to be the antithesis of the imposed dictatorship that resulted in Spain. For that reason,
the analysis of Aguilar’s work is necessarily comparative in the sense that there are more
differences than similarities in the two cases.

35
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After the Spanish Civil War, Franco’s victorious Nationalists agreed that is was best to
“silence the bitter voices of the past”36 and disallowed any recognition of the Republican cause
or struggle. Aguilar writes that
After the Civil War, Spain was forced to face a panorama of divided memories.
A large proportion of the memories of the losing side… resided in exile, and those
that remained were silenced through repression and censorship… these memories
only existed at a family level, and even then this was not always the case due to
the fear of repression.37
Because of this phobia of narrative difference, the Franco regime implemented a rigid system of
socialization that silenced dissonant voices and imposed the narrative of events necessary to
maintain power:
Throughout the almost forty-year span of the régime, numerous rites were created
that established a sense of continuity with a glorious ancestral past and with the
spirit of victory relating to the Civil War. However, this process of
mythologisation witnessed a number of serious problems given that it evoked a
rupture of national unity. It is not possible to construct the founding myth of a
nation on a division of this kind, at least not for long.38
Though there was a perceived consensus in the sense that there were no opposing voices in the
arena, it was an imposed and therefore illegitimate consensus that covered up rather than
addressing the ruptured, fragmented understandings of events. Aguilar describes the
superficiality of national consensus under Franco saying
The régime was never capable of bringing about real reconciliation because this
would have undermined the foundations of its legitimacy by allowing the
population to reach the conclusion that the war had been an unnecessary farce.
True reconciliation cannot be reached without a degree of political openness that did not come
about in Spain until after Franco’s death, but that began immediately after the peace negotiations
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in El Salvador. Aguilar’s book demonstrates that when national wounds are artificially covered,
they must be reconciled with eventually because an imposed consensus is a false consensus.
In visiting El Salvador after reading Aguilar’s book, I began to see manifestations of the
difference between a case of imposed consensus (i.e. Spain as described in Memory and
Amnesia), and a country where no adequate consensus has been reached, but a variety of
powerful institutions have the ability to promote and preserve their narratives. Because of
Aguilar’s analysis, I believe that the fragmentation of understanding in the Salvadoran case,
exemplified by the figures discussed in Chapter 2, is in fact a healthy and necessary step towards
a true reconciliation narrative, such as the one that emerged in Spain a half-century after their
conflict. In Spain’s case, the narrative of war as collective madness that implicates all and
blames no-one has risen in prominence.39 Though a generally acceptable, unifying narrative is
not yet evident in the Salvadoran case, I do believe that the two historical figures discussed in
Chapter 3 show the beginnings of a shared understanding that cannot be come to without
acknowledging the fragmented nature of a civil conflict.
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Methods
During the summer of 2010, I traveled to El Salvador for five weeks to conduct
interviews and make observations about the way that the four historical figures featured in my
project are currently being articulated and represented in sites of memory, particularly museums
and monuments. I chose to interview people that I consider to be carriers of memory, and who
are powerful enough to make an impact on the eventual historical narrative of the war. Thanks
to my father’s work, reputation, and connections as a former correspondent for the Washington
Post, I had access to some of El Salvador’s leading thinkers and political actors, all of whom had
an active roll in the conflict itself. As a bilingual Salvadoran-American, I found myself in a
special position to conduct this research as both an insider and an outsider.
Ultimately, I was able to conduct fourteen interviews with: five current members of the
FMLN who are part of Mauricio Funes’ administration, three university professors, two museum
curators (one from the Museo de la Revolución in Morazán and the other from the Museo de la
Palabra y la Imagen in San Salvador), one ARENA politician, one PDC politician, one military
official, and one descendant of the coffee-growing oligarchy, who helped to found ARENA in
the early 1980s.40
I was able to network much more effectively within the Salvadoran left than with the
right, so unfortunately the voices I catalogued in my interviews are overwhelmingly sympathetic
to the FMLN and to more leftist ideologies. In order to supplement the narrative of the right, I
have included quotes taken from two texts written by former military officers: a military school
textbook entitled In Defense of the Fatherland: A History of the Armed Conflict in El Salvador
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1980-1992, by former general Humberto Corado Figueroa, and a combined testimony and
political analysis entitled Profiles of the War by former general Juan Orlando Zepeda. Though
right-wing military history and political history are not one and the same I did not find adequate
sources written by prominent right-wing thinkers outside of the military establishment.
My interviews were semi-structured and I used the same prepared list of questions with
politicians, military officers, and academics. These including, “how would you explain the
Salvadoran Civil War to someone with no knowledge of our country’s history?” and “I am
focusing my project on [each of the four historical figures]. What was his roll in the conflict, and
what does he mean today?” However, I tailored some interviews, such as those with the museum
curators and the politicians who were involved in constructing particular monuments, to their
efforts to preserve or commemorate history. They were all conducted in Spanish, and later
translated. Some were transcribed and translated by a paid Salvadoran transcriber, and others I
processed myself.
Also, some politicians had very strict time constraints and only allowed me to interview
them for a few minutes. In those circumstances, I limited my interview questions to those
especially pertinent to his or her position in politics (i.e., I asked Commander Schafik Handal’s
son, who today is a federal legislator, more specific questions about his father than about the
other three figures).
Though my methods fall short of encapsulating a full picture of El Salvador’s current
political landscape, my small sample of interviewees includes some very powerful actors who
belong to even more powerful institutions. Thus their thoughts, opinions, and narrative
interpretations of events are more likely to reflect the direction that official history is taking at
the present time, nineteen years after the end of the civil conflict.
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Chapter 2
Divisive Narratives:
Colonel Monterrosa and Major d’Aubuisson
In this chapter, I will discuss the competing narratives that simultaneously exist about
Colonel Domingo Monterrosa and Major Roberto d’Aubuisson. Polarized understandings of
these two men are consistently divided between the political left and the political right, e.g. those
who fought for the FMLN during the war, and those who either were part of the military, or
sympathized with those who fought against the guerrillas. These divisions demonstrate the stark
polarization that continues to linger in post-war El Salvador. However, it also demonstrates the
relative openness that has resulted from the Peace Accord. Because of the negotiated peace,
institutions and political parties can hold up the figures they choose and though there may be
backlash and dissent from other sectors of society, there is not an officially sanctioned silencing,
as has occurred in the wake of other civil conflicts in the twentieth century.
Though there is inevitably some overlap in the descriptions of both d’Aubuisson and
Monterrosa on the left and right, each of them is remembered in fundamentally different ways by
each side. Monterrosa is held up by conservatives and the military in particular as their greatest
soldier, and as a martyr. On the other hand, the left remembers him for leading his troops in the
undertaking of several infamous massacres, among them the internationally recognized slaughter
that occurred in El Mozote. The FMLN also remembers and celebrates the intelligence operation
that took his life. Roberto d’Aubuisson similarly elicits responses polarized along political
divisions. Conservatives, both military and non-military, hail him for his key role in containing
communist aggression and bringing democracy to El Salvador. The left remembers him
primarily for his role as the head of paramilitary death squads, and particularly as the intellectual
architect of Archbishop Oscar Romero’s assassination in 1980.
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The narratives that exist about these two men are often dissonant and in some cases,
directly contradictory. This is in part because each of them is directly linked, through
testimonial evidence, to some of the worst and most publicly recognized atrocities of the conflict,
and yet their respective institutions do not condemn them, but rather lift them up as leaders who
did what was necessary in difficult circumstances. Their critics cannot look past the crimes that
they are accused of, and because both of these men died decades ago, neither was brought to
justice. The societal wounds that they left behind remain unhealed and foster disharmony rather
than reconciliation.
Though this project was not designed with the intention of arguing that right-wing figures
are polarizing and left-wing figures are unifying, the United Nations Truth Commission Report,
which compiled more than 22,000 victim statements,41 claims that 60% of the reported human
rights violations were perpetrated by the armed forces; 25% were committed by police and the
National Guard; 20% were committed by military escorts and in self-defense; 10 % were carried
out by death squads; and only 5% were reported to have been committed by the FMLN.42
Though ARENA and the military do not accept these figures, it is clear that the right wing
carried out a disproportionate percentage of the violence as compared to the guerrillas, and thus
there are few documented, high-profile cases of FMLN abuses that could be comparable either to
the El Mozote massacre, or to Romero’s assassination.

Colonel Domingo Monterrosa
Domingo Monterrosa Barrios, born in 1940, began his rise to prominence during his time
at the Gerardo Barrios Military Academy as a teenager. He stood out as one of the strongest and
most charismatic of the tanda, or graduating class, of 1963. After graduation, he taught at the
41
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academy before going on to be trained at the U.S. military base in Panama, and was chosen to
learn special counter-insurgency strategies in Taiwan before returning to El Salvador in the early
1970s. After Colonel Arturo Molina took power in the controversial 1972 elections, Monterrosa
became one of his closest friends and advisors, and thus one of the most powerful individuals in
the country.43
During the conflict, Colonel Monterrosa was chosen to command the Atlacatl Battalion,
the most elite of the rapid reaction units trained by the U.S. military. Journalist Mark Danner
describes his leadership saying, “Monterrosa seemed a soldier of the classic type: aggressive,
charismatic, a man who liked nothing better than to get out in the field and fight alongside his
troops. The Salvadoran grunts… loved Monterrosa for his willingness to get down in the dirt
with them and fight.”44 The colonel’s leadership earned him the respect and loyalty of many
both inside and outside the military.
However, Monterrosa’s legacy is tainted because of the Atlacatl Batallion’s adherence to
the belief that all civilians residing in guerrilla-controlled territories were indistinguishable from,
and thus equally dangerous as guerrillas themselves.45 This idea resulted in several of the
conflict’s most infamous massacres, in particular the annihilation of the entire town (save one
survivor) of El Mozote in December, 1981. The massacre claimed the lives of at least 800
civilians, among them more than 400 children.46 This massacre, and others in the regions of
Morazán and Chalatenango were actively denied for years both by the Salvadoran government
and the U.S. Congress, who continued funding the Salvadoran armed forces despite reports of
extreme human rights abuses such as these.

43

Mark Danner, “The Massacre at El Mozote,” The New Yorker 6 Dec. 1993, 56.
Danner, 61.
45
Danner, 59.
46
For a full description of the atrocities committed in this massacre, please reference Danner’s article in full.
44

25

In 1984, the ERP faction of the FMLN, which controlled the department of Morazán
(under the direction of commander Joaquín Villalobos) developed a plan to kill Monterrosa
which hinged on his obsession with the rebel radio station, Radio Venceremos (roughly
translated as Radio We Shall Be Victorious), which broadcast from combat zones in the
mountainous forests near the Honduran border. Monterrosa considered the destruction of the
radio station as vital to demoralizing and weakening the guerrilla movement. He was also well
known for keeping trophies from the sites of important military victories, and based on this
knowledge, the FMLN designed a Trojan horse-style operation that they hoped would lure the
officer into enemy territory.
The guerrillas provoked a skirmish, allowed a fake transmitter filled with explosives to be
captured by the army, and cut transmission in order to convince the military that they had truly
captured Radio Venceremos. In four long years of transmission, the radio had never before gone
dead. Military intelligence took this to mean that the transmitter had truly been abandoned.
Once Colonel Monterrosa heard the news, he decided that he and his five closest military
advisers would personally retrieve the transmitter in a helicopter. With the radio equipment
successfully captured and placed in the chopper, the colonel and his advisors took off with their
trophy in tow. From the ground, FMLN guerrillas detonated the explosives hidden inside the
transmitter, and watched the helicopter, filled with elite military personnel, explode in the sky
above the mountains.47
This event rocked the military establishment and energized guerilla forces across the
country. With the passing of time, Monterrosa has remained a central figure within military
history. The military museum honors him with his own exhibit, decorated with a floor-to-ceiling
47
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portrait of the colonel, his uniform, and plaques explaining his excellence as an officer. Current
and former military personnel, as well as many right-wing sympathizers, remember him as the
best of the best, an example of excellence and a symbol of sacrifice. His death is also considered
to be an example of the barbarous tactics employed by the guerrillas, who refused to play by the
rules of war.
For the FMLN, this story remains as one of the great moments in the mythology of the
movement because it epitomizes their overarching David and Goliath narrative. It is a story
often retold in the region of Morazán, where the events took place. The Museo de la Revolución
(Museum of the Revolution) in Morazán even houses the remnants of the Colonel’s helicopter in
a permanent outdoor exhibit. Colonel Monterrosa is remembered in equal measure as a martyr
and as a villain by sectors of society unwilling to compromise their own understanding of events,
and thus parallel narratives are maintained by parallel institutions, particularly museums.
Though he is a divisive figure overall, some aspects of the narrative surrounding Colonel
Monterrosa are consistent and unified, particularly his reputation as a good soldier and a
charismatic leader. Even his enemies during the war discuss these attributes. For instance,
Carlos Henriquez Consalvi, the head of Radio Venceremos who played an instrumental role in
developing the plan that killed Monterrosa said of him that, “he was very upstanding and had a
lot of military initiative.”48 Dagoberto Gutierrez, another former guerrilla also commented that
In El Salvador’s cruel and total war, the government’s army had in Monterrosa its
boldest, most audacious and hardworking leader. Us guerrilleros, we recognized
hardworking leaders, we knew that they were the ones that woke up at 5 am and
started moving their troops towards us. We knew that. Monterrosa was one of
those.49
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This sentiment was echoed in more than half of the twelve interviews that discussed Monterrosa
from all across the military and political spectrum. However, the right-wing and military
interviewees celebrate him as a hero, while the left, particularly those interviewees who were
formerly guerrillas, qualified their acknowledgements of his military prowess with mentions of
the human rights violations he committed.
For the conservative sector of Salvadoran society, particularly the military, Colonel
Monterrosa is often acclaimed as one of the best soldiers in history, and his death is considered
to be particularly tragic. For instance, Alfredo Mena Lagos, a conservative talk-show host and
founding member of the ARENA political party, said of him that “he was an honest official. He
was effective, and he could have done a lot of good things for his country. That’s why they
killed him.”50 This sentiment was elaborated upon by General Mauricio Vargas, who served
under him at the beginning of the conflict:
I had the opportunity to meet him and work with him, so I can say that he was a
man that established special civilian and military relationships. He also harvested
and supported the search for a resolution of the conflict. His death was a very
grave loss for the institution, he was a spearhead, a symbol. With his leadership a
change occurred in the armed forces. His death was very painful and it wasn’t
only felt by the armed forces but also by the other sectors that he had worked
with.51
In official statements of military history, the same narrative is also reproduced. This is most
clearly seen in the following two examples, the first from the military school textbook In Defense
of the Fatherland which states that:
The [Atlacatl] battalion numbered more than a thousand soldiers under the
command of Lt. Col. Domingo Monterrosa Barrios, who was later proclaimed by
the voice of the people as a martyr and hero of the Fatherland.52
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This text not only asserts Monterrosa’s martyrdom but also claims that his reputation as a hero is
derived from popular mythology, perpetuated by the Salvadoran people rather than the military
establishment.
The second and most overt example of how the military officially maintains the narrative
of Colonel Monterrosa as a martyr is the permanent exhibit dedicated to him in the Museo
Militar Ex-Cuartel El Zapote (the museum of military history, housed in a former barrack in the
outlying San Salvador neighborhood of San Jacinto). One entire room is dedicated to his
memory and is titled:

Figure 2.153
At the entrance of the exhibit stands a plaque that reads:
This exhibit is presented in memory of the one called, at the moment of his death,
the Commander of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, born leader and brilliant fighter: Lt.
Col DEM Domingo Monterrosa Barrios, a war hero who offered up his life in the
fulfillment of his duty on the 23rd of October, 1984. This man, a symbol of the
military campaign undertaken between 1980 and 1992, brought glory to the pages
of military history, and today we honor his memory.
The exhibit features a floor-to-ceiling portrait of the officer, and many of his personal effects
including his uniform, his medals, and his journals (pictured in Figure 2.2). Nowhere in the
exhibit are there descriptions either of the particular operations he was associated with, or the
manner in which he was killed.
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Figure 2.254
These omissions stand in stark contrast to the two-fold manner in which the left speaks
about Colonel Monterrosa. Rather than focus on his accomplishments, interviewees highlighted
the human rights violations that he and the Atlacatl battalion committed, particularly in the
department of Morazán, near the border with Honduras, as well as describing the operation in
which he was killed. For instance, Nidia Díaz, a former PRTC guerrilla and current
representative to the Central American Congress described him saying,
He was ruthless; he would drug his battalion so that they would commit the most
atrocious of crimes. Everyone feared the Atlacatl battalion for their unabashed
brutality…. He had accumulated so much hatred among the revolutionary forces because
he was responsible for the deaths of campesinos, of civilians, mostly.55
This was similarly described by Carlos Henriquez Consalvi, who founded Radio Venceremos
and was an active ERP guerrilla in Morazán. Unlike Díaz, he specifically referenced the
massacre at El Mozote:
[Monterrosa] was named head of the Atlacatl Battalion, as we know, this battalion
was involved in many massacres across the whole country but the worst and most
emblematic one was the massacre of El Mozote which left a thousand peasants
dead among them 400 young children.56
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The colonel was similarly discussed by Ronaldo Cáceres, a former ERP guerrilla in Morazán
who later founded the Museo de la Revolución (Museum of the Revolution) near the remains of
El Mozote in the town of Perquín:
This guy was a very effective military man, he ascended to becoming officer and
wanted to be minister of defense. The first elite battalion is sworn in on August
15th 1981, the Atlacatl Battalion. In December, between the 9 and 11, under his
command, they committed the biggest massacre in our country, El Mozote.57
These quotes illustrate the tendency for the left to describe Colonel Monterrosa in terms of the
atrocities that his battalion committed and highlight the brutality of these acts.
Logically, those who belonged to the FMLN during the war also highlighted the
operation in which Monterrosa was killed. It is held up as a moment that particularly represents
the innovation of the guerrillas in the face of an enemy armed and trained by the United States.
For instance, Carlos Henríquez Consalvi, who played a leadership role in the operation because
he was the head of the clandestine radio station, described the event saying,
The guerrilla sets up a trap as old as the Trojan horse and that is when he dies, in a
helicopter that was taken down, along with other military chiefs, very close to
where the massacre of El Mozote took place. His death was a very harsh blow to
the military, and being that, it was also a point in favor of peace.58
Others included even more detail in their account of Monterrosa’s death. For instance, Nidia
Díaz, a former PRTC guerrilla, gave a more extensive version of events:
So in 1984, when he says that he has destroyed the radio station, he took the
transmitter in his helicopter, but it was really a bomb. It was an intelligence
mission for the guerrillas that worked in the Western part of El Salvador… He
took the radio as a trophy, but it exploded in his helicopter, and that’s how he
died, that’s how the operation was. It’s not that I’m happy about it, but I want to
tell you that the day he died, the Salvadoran people felt a great sense of relief, the
entire guerrilla force and much of the civilian population, because he really was
very blood-thirsty… His death was felt by the powerful sectors of society because
he was their best military strategist… but I don’t recognize anything positive
about him. Other people might, but in my case, I saw the people suffer because of
57
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the horrific operations he conducted against the civilian population, so I can’t
recognize any sort of merit. 59
Beyond these testimonies about the importance of Monterrosa’s death, the gesture that
symbolizes the left’s celebration of this strategic victory is the preservation of the helicopter’s
remains at the Museo de la Revolución in Perquín, Morazán (pictured in Figure 2.3). The
director, Rolando Cáceres, describes the operation that killed the colonel, and why the museum
continues to house the destroyed chopper:
Monterrosa puts the transmitter on his lap and the helicopter climbs and as it nears
a hill, [it] detonates and the helicopter is turned into a fireball that kills everyone
inside on October 23rd 1984 at 16:00 hours in Joateca. The Trojan horse worked
they tell us, we gave them the trophy and with the trophy came defeat. All the
heads of Operation Torola 4 are killed in a single strategic move. This leaves us
with a lesson as all war stories do, war is not won by the strongest but by the
smartest. We kept the helicopter’s remains- what we did so that they would not be
taken away was drop walls on them and hide them, because they took all the
bodily remains, but we came back after the war and now we have the
[helicopter’s] remains here.60

Figure 2.361
Overall, the left has a somewhat nuanced view of Monterrosa, as someone who possessed
and was respected for his unrivalled military and strategic skills. This view is simultaneously
reconciled with the idea that he was a brutal killer, who was cold-hearted enough to kill civilians,
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especially children. The following quote, articulated by Professor of Philosophy Ricardo Ribera,
synthesizes the three primary narrative elements present in left-wing accounts of who
Monterrosa was:
From a military perspective, he was a very efficient soldier. Of course he dies the
victim of a booby trap… which contradicts his myth a bit, that he falls for the
false radio transmitter. Villalobos [the FMLN commander in Morazán] was more
astute than he was. That’s the trouble with his mythology. From the public’s
point of view, taking into account human rights abuses, he is the one responsible
for the Mozote massacre, among many others. So one has to ask, why have they
picked him, why not look for someone else, since he has this shadow over him?
Brilliant, but also one of the most heinous violators of human rights.62
In this excerpt from his interview, Ribera acknowledges Monterrosa’s military skill, as well as
mentioning both the manner in which he died and the atrocities he is associated with.
The quotes above illustrate the way in which the right and the left have constructed
parallel and competing narratives about Colonel Domingo Monterrosa. On the one hand, he is
among the most esteemed and revered figures in Salvadoran military history. Simultaneously,
the left holds firmly to the narrative of Monterrosa as one of El Salvador’s most brutal abusers of
human rights, who achieved greatness through unforgivable means, and whose death brought
relief to terrorized populations across the northern and western provinces.

Major Roberto d’Aubuisson
Roberto d’Aubuisson Arrieta was born on August 23, 1943 to a middle-class family of
French descent on the outskirts of San Salvador. He was educated in a military academy and as
a young man served in the National Guard, where he began training in national security and
intelligence. D’Aubuisson rose to greater prominence when Jorge Alberto Medrano, the
National Guard’s commander, took him under his wing as his protégé in the 1960s. During the
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1970s, d’Aubuisson was chosen to study intelligence and security in Virginia, New York,
Taiwan, Uruguay, and later on at the U.S. military base in Panama.63
By the end of the 1970s, d’Aubuisson had reached the rank of Major. In 1979, a proreform military junta conducted a coup against President Carlos Humberto Romero, and in the
process purged hard-line right-wing officers, including d’Aubuisson. Despite being expelled
from the military, he went on to found the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista, or ARENA
(National Republican Alliance) political party in 1981. It in turn became the political
mouthpiece for the most conservative Salvadorans who fought against all kinds of political
change, in particular agrarian reform.
These same powerful interests also allegedly bankrolled paramilitary groups, known as
death squads, to silence those who supported change.64 In particular, d’Aubuisson and the death
squads have been linked through informal testimony to the assassination of Archbishop Oscar
Arnulfo Romero (discussed more at length in Chapter 3). This evidence came to light in 1987,
when the get-away driver who assisted in killing the Archbishop came forward with his
testimony.65
Roberto d’Aubuisson was known simply as “The Major,” and began appearing on
national television to denounce “subversives,” from school teachers to labor leaders to
politicians. Within days of his pronouncements, the corpses of these same individuals would
most often be found disfigured and with signs of torture. These killings became known as the
signature modus operandi of the death squads, and d’Aubuisson’s connection to them was
publicly known, but largely unspoken, for fear of retribution. Despite these associations,
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d’Aubuisson enjoyed widespread popular support among people of all social and economic
background because of his charisma and political skill.66
During the 1980s, d’Aubuisson entered the political arena in earnest, serving as the
president of El Salvador’s national Constituent Assembly in 1982 and 1983. In 1984, he ran for
president as ARENA’s candidate, but narrowly lost to the Partido Demócrata Cristiano
(Christian Democratic Party, or PDC) candidate José Napoleón Duarte.67 68 In the elections of
1989, he abdicated his place as ARENA’s candidate, and the party ran Alfredo Cristiani instead,
who was victorious over his PDC opponent. Though throughout the conflict, d’Aubuisson had
been staunchly against negotiating with the guerrillas, he gradually changed his mind as the war
went on, and supported President Cristiani’s participation in the peace talks between 1990 and
the signing of the accords in 1992. 69 He died on February 20, 1992 after a long battle with
throat cancer, scarcely a month after the Peace Accord was signed in Chapultepec, Mexico.
The opinions expressed by interviewees show that d’Aubuisson was a multi-faceted and
controversial figure who enjoyed both widespread popular support and complicity, while
simultaneously engendering a deep-seated hatred within the FMLN and their supporters.
Because of this, distinct narratives have emerged from the right and the left to explain his
significance as a historical figure. The right focuses on his accomplishments and leadership,
while the left highlights the atrocities that he is associated with, much in the same way as they do
in Colonel Monterrosa’s case.
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For ARENA and those less formally affiliated with the right-wing, d’Aubuisson is
primarily remembered for founding the party and for responding to the heightened communist
threat that loomed after the Sandinista victory in neighboring Nicaragua. His friend and fellow
founder of ARENA, Alfredo Mena Lagos described him saying, “He had his good side and his
bad side. He was a very charismatic leader. However he was not very principled. On the other
hand, he was someone who helped contain communist aggression.”70 Similarly, Milagro Navas,
an ARENA mayor from the San Salvador suburb of Antiguo Cuscatlán claimed that,
I joined [ARENA] because Roberto d’Aubuisson had clear principles and ideas
about what he wanted for our country. These came about because of the dangers
that there were during that time that socialism and communism could creep into
our country… He was the maximum leader of our party. Those of us who love
ARENA, the ones who love our country, remember him with that sort of
fondness. 71
This was also stated in the memoir of General Orlando Zepeda who wrote that,
D’aubuison [sic]…became the hero of the right, he was the standard-bearer in
both the civilian and military fight against the communist threat, the politicalsocial phenomenon named D’aubuisson [sic] wrote himself into our nation’s
history; later, with a group of other concerned civilians, he founds the Alianza
Republicana Nacionalista [ARENA], a political movement that managed to
strengthen and organize the democratic right wing, which had previously been
unstable and in the midst of an institutional crisis.72
Other right-wing quotes mention d’Aubuisson’s alleged involvement with death squads and the
accusations of his responsibility for Archbishop Romero’s assassination. For instance, Mayor
Milagro Navas went on to say that, “I think the Major needs to be remembered. What happened
is that they accused him of all kinds of things, including that he ordered the killing of Monseñor
Romero, which we all know, well at least I believe, isn’t true.”73 Similarly, when General
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Mauricio Vargas discussed Major d’Aubuisson, he did describe him as the founder of ARENA,
and also hesitantly mentioned the accusations against him saying
[d’Aubuisson] forms the political party that rules the country over four terms,
twenty years. He becomes a symbol for the right, specifically the more
conservative right… He is accused of death squads and of many things, but what I
know about it is hearsay and what I’ve read, but I don’t know for sure… I don’t
know whether any of it is true or not.74
It is only in these limited ways that the right wing tenuously alludes to the darker side of
d’Aubuisson’s legacy. Unsurprisingly, these are the same elements that are emphasized by his
enemies, who hope to discredit the mythology of d’Aubuisson as a national hero.
Former and current members of the left have a generally unified understanding of who
d’Aubuisson was. Though he is often recognized as an important and intelligent leader, the
alleged atrocities he is associated with overshadow his merits. For instance Professor Ricardo
Ribera of the Jesuit Central American University said of him that,
One always speaks well of the deceased, but even dead everyone speaks badly of
d’Aubuisson. Those were terrible times… and we can’t dump all the atrocities on
one person. He was not just a genocidal torturer, but also an intelligent guy, a
political animal… Of course he was probably the intellectual author of Romero’s
assassination, but he was also an important leader in the peace process.75
Similarly, Nidia Díaz, former PRTC guerrilla and current member of the Central American
Congress, described him saying that,
For us, d’Aubuisson was the founder first of the death squads and later of
ARENA. He was such an ideologue, terrible, he was against the people… he was
intolerant. He refused to have any sort of dialogue at the beginning, though by
the end of the war he supported negotiation… Within his party, he was the
prevailing voice. Though he changed his mind, he originally did not favor a
political solution, he saw the proponents of dialogue as enemies… He was a
leader, even though he didn’t have much money, he became the number one
defender of the oligarchy’s interests. He worked for the oligarchy so they would
finance the death squads… He even had fascist tendencies.76
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This was expressed in more Marxist terms by Dagoberto Gutierrez, former PCES guerrilla and
current professor at the Lutheran Univesity of El Salvador:
He was very smart… you know the leader is the one that expresses the
psychology of a part of society…. He became an instrument of the oligarchy and
his methods, the death squads and his repressive agents, did nothing more than to
stress the political regime of this country. In this country there has never been a
consensus…. He formed a party that served as an instrument of the dominant
class and unified it under the classes’ control.77
Gerson Martínez, a former FPL guerrilla and current Minister of the Interior, also stated that,
He did not come up with death squadrons in the country. Way before his time,
things like that were already happening here… but I think the fact that dishonored
him the most was his participation in the assassination of Monseñor Romero.78
Overall, the left remembers Major d’Aubuisson as a successful and charismatic politician, but his
ties to the death squads, and particularly the accusation that he ordered Archbishop Romero’s
assassination provoke such a degree of hatred that his positive legacy is significantly
overshadowed.
Both sides still actively promote their narratives, and on some occasions, these collide
head-on. One site where this conflict plays out is the traffic circle in Antiguo Cuscatlán built for
d’Aubuisson in 2006. The monument on the circle has four sides, each emblazoned with one of
the Major’s signature slogans: “Fatherland Yes! Communism No!”; “First El Salvador, Second
El Salvador, Third El Salvador”; “Present for the Fatherland!”; and “The most powerful weapon
that free men possess is the vote.” In the middle stands a towering flag pole with the Salvadoran
flag waving at the top. Every year on the anniversary of Archbishop Romero’s death, protesters
gather at this monument to remind the world of d’Aubuisson’s involvement, and on this occasion
in 2010, the monument was defaced (pictured in Figure 2.5). The graffiti consisted of the spray-
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painted outline of a body on the ground, and the words Asesino quien, roughly translated as “who
are you calling an assassin?”79 written across the base.
The defacement of d’Aubuisson’s monument nicely juxtaposes manifestations of the two
narratives, and illustrates the passion with which each side holds on to their own beliefs. The
monument itself serves to promote the narrative of d’Aubuisson as a hero, specifically as El
Salvador’s number one patriot, and as the father of democracy. The graffiti in turn is a reminder
that others remember him as the great assassin, who ordered the death of countless Salvadorans,
many of them who remain anonymous, as the outline on the ground conveys.

Figure 2.580
Colonel Monterrosa and Major d’Aubuisson illustrate cases where clear-cut, oppositional
narratives have emerged. For the right-wing, both are hailed as heroes due to the exceptional
skills they each possessed, Monterrosa as a military strategist, and d’Aubuisson as a politician.
The main trope used by the right to discuss Monterrosa is that he died a martyr, and that he was a
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model figure to be emulated by future generations of soldiers. On the left, some such as
Professor Ricardo Ribera of the Jesuit Central American University (UCA), are disappointed that
the military has chosen Monterrosa as their exemplary figure. He expressed this to me saying,
One has to wonder, why did they pick him, why not someone else without that
shadow?... It’s not so much that there weren’t other heroes, it reflects the ideology
of the military to have picked him, it’s a case of ideological belligerence… it’s
too bad because future generations of the military will have to carry that legacy
placed upon them by the war-time leaders. It’s ideological belligerency, it’s
saying, if they accuse us of violating human rights, let’s hold up the greatest of
the violators, let’s build him a statue, it’s challenging the construction of true
democracy, it’s a battle of symbology… In the long run, it will be a dishonor for
the military to hold up those who violate human rights.81
Though many interviewees from all across the political spectrum recognized Monterrosa’s
extraordinary abilities as an officer, the left cannot accept him because he and his battalion are
credibly linked to numerous atrocities that occurred during the war.
Similarly, D’Aubuisson is recognized by all as a charismatic figure who was able to
bring unity to the right. Because he founded ARENA, the party and their followers continue to
describe him as the ultimate politician and hold him up as a founding father who was unfairly
accused of committing (or ordering) crimes perpetrated by the death squads, in particular
Romero’s assassination. However, it is unlikely that he will become a generally accepted or
unifying figure because of these accusations, grounded in testimonial evidence, that the left
continually turn to.
Though it is unlikely that either of these men will be collectively forgotten in the near
future, neither is it likely that they will become pan-political national icons as both the military
and ARENA hope. The divisions in Salvadoran society are too deep, and the conflict is too
recent, for people who are linked with war crimes to be forgiven and held up through a national
consensus. Also, because both of these men are deceased, it is easier for mythologies to emerge
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about them, and yet they cannot be brought to justice. Thus those who remember or
experienced the crimes that Monterrosa and d’Aubuisson allegedly committed will never find
the kind of closure needed for the national wounds to heal.
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Chapter 3
Unified (and Potentially Unifying) Narratives:
Archbishop Romero and Commander Handal

Figure 3.182
While some figures such as Roberto d’Aubuisson and Domingo Monterrosa remain
irreconcilably divisive, others have to potential to bring people together. In this chapter, I will
discuss the consistent, or unified, patterns I saw in narratives concerning Archbishop Oscar
Romero and Commander Schafik Jorge Handal, pictured in Figure 3.1. I will also consider
evidence that these narratives have the power to be potentially unifying. It is important to
distinguish between unified and unifying narratives, because though they are interrelated, they
are not interchangeable terms. In the context of this project, I consider that unified narratives are
common understandings or interpretations of historical figures that are articulated by people
across the political spectrum, who may have even played militarily oppositional roles in the civil
conflict. This is in contrast to the competing narratives described in the preceding chapter, that
do not allow for a common understanding, and do not foster healing.
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Unified, common understandings have the potential to become unifying narratives or
interpretations that can function as part of the post-war reconciliation process. If people can
recognize that there is some common ground in place, it could be the starting point for dialogue
about the divisive aspects of the war. There is some evidence that this is beginning to happen in
the cases of Romero and Handal, through the acceptance of commemorative events and public
sites of memory (in these cases, monuments). Though it is difficult to measure the degree to
which a society has a unified understanding of its history, I believe that the allowance of public
and permanent commemorations of these two figures demonstrates a tacit agreement on the part
of their former enemies to recognize their historical importance with minimal challenges.
In this chapter, I will show that Archbishop Romero is consistently remembered as (a) the
voice of the voiceless, and (b) as a universal religious and moral guide or compass. Commander
Schafik Handal is also remember in a two-fold way as (a) a key negotiator during the peace
process, and (b) as a consistent, honest politician in the post-war period. The universally
appealing qualities that are used to describe these figures, as a defender of human rights and a
peace negotiator respectively, and as champions of democracy, show possible pieces of a future
reconciliation narrative that can only be developed over the passage of generations.

Archbishop Oscar Romero
“Every war in itself is dehumanizing, but Romero’s voice was a call to keep our humanity even
in the direst of circumstances. We all revere Monseñor Romero, I am a Christian, but even those
who aren’t, revere him.” –Gerson Martínez (Minister of the Interior, FMLN)
The image of Archbishop Oscar Romero is among the most pervasive in El Salvador.
His face is graffiti-ed on public buildings, hung in the offices of political officials, painted on the
sides of churches and displayed on the walls of people’s homes. Every year on March 24th,
millions of Salvadorans around the world hold vigils, services, concerts and other events to
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remember his assassination, mid-homily, during the most gruesome period of state-sponsored
repression in El Salvador. Today, a copper colored statue of the martyred priest stands at San
Salvador’s central intersection, a controversial yet accepted reminder of the conflict that ravished
the nation for twelve long years.
Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero was assassinated in 1980 for his public
denouncement of violence, particularly state-sponsored repression. Romero became Archbishop
of San Salvador as government repression against protestors and activists swelled during the late
1970s. Though he was originally a moderate priest with conservative tendencies, he became
increasingly critical of the repression he witnessed against civilians, activists, and clergy. He
began to speak out against the repression after the murder of his friend and fellow cleric, Rutilio
Grande in 1977. His homilies, broadcast by radio across the nation, called for all factions to end
violence, and preached a divine preference for the poor. He repeatedly called soldiers to disobey
orders to kill, and to desert the military.83
Romero’s weekly radio addresses made him many enemies, both within the Catholic
church and among conservatives, who considered his teachings inflammatory and out of line.
Other Salvadoran bishops even went so far as to send a secret letter to the Vatican, reporting his
"politicized" activities and claiming he was unfit for his high position in the church.84 He was
assassinated on March 24th, 1980 during one such homily by an unidentified sniper, who fired a
shot from a Volkswagen parked outside the Divina Providencia chapel, as described in the
United Nations Truth Commission Report. The Truth Commission also concludes that it was
“the ex-major Roberto d’Aubuisson who gave the order to assassinate the Archbishop, and gave
precise instructions to members of his security detail, who acted as a ‘death squad’, to organize
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and supervise the assassination’s execution.”85 No one has yet been brought to justice for his
death.
As the oligarchy celebrated his assassination as a victory for the existing social order, his
martyrdom convinced many staunch believers in non-violent resistance that a better future could
only be achieved through armed revolution, and support for the FMLN swelled after his death.
For some, this event marks the beginning of the armed conflict. Throughout the war he was
invoked by the guerrilla movement as a martyr who symbolized the death of peaceful social
reconciliation, while the military and oligarchy considered his assassination a victory against the
forces of change by eliminating “la voz de los sin voz” (the voice of the voiceless). He and other
priests who spread the doctrine of Liberation Theology were instrumental in awakening class
consciousness among poor rural communities.
Today, thirty-one years since his death, the memory of Archbishop Romero is in the
process of becoming unifying rather than divisive. He did not officially represent any of the
factions that fought the war; rather, he was a cultural figure speaking out for peace and social
justice. Because he chose to ally himself with the poor and the voiceless rather than with a
particular political organization, and fought with words rather than weapons, he is becoming
accepted by most sectors of Salvadoran society as a symbol of peace that must be upheld and
remembered. He is a figure of both national and international importance, who highlights the role
of progressive sectors within the Salvadoran Catholic Church in mobilizing against injustice,
both in his own time and in the present day.
In many of the interviews I conducted during July and August of 2010, I found evidence
of a unified narrative emerging around the figure of Romero. Based on my interviews, I have
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identified two over-arching tropes that are used repeatedly to discuss Romero’s significance in
both life and death: Romero as the “voice of the voiceless” and Romero as a non-partisan,
spiritual and moral guide. The first of these represents a feeling that the specific values he stood
for (preference for the poor) and the actions he took (speaking out to defend the oppressed) were
universal human values lost in the madness of war. The second encompasses the sentiment that
Romero was an apolitical figure, who should be embraced by Salvadorans of all political stripes.
These two elements, one with specific reference to his beliefs and one that describes his
universal representation of the Salvadoran nation, work together to construct Romero as a
unifying post-war figure. Logically there are those who belong to the extreme right wing, and to
particular sectors of the military who speak of Romero as being a political instrument who
sympathized with the communist cause. However, the majority of my interviewees, whether
current FMLN members, former FMLN members, or moderate conservatives, spoke of Romero
using the “voice of the voiceless” and “spiritual guide” tropes described above.
The verbatim phrase la voz de los sin voz, or the “voice of the voiceless” appeared time
and again in my research. Even when individuals did not use the exact words, all of the ten
interviewees who answered questions about Romero86 discussed the archbishop’s role as a
mouthpiece or speaker in some way, including his critics. It is clear that Romero’s public
homilies, preached over the radio and in churches all over El Salvador during his three years as
Archbishop, brought him fame in his own time and established the beginning of his historical
legacy.
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Romero’s voice and role as a speaker are discussed by many as being important both in
life and in death. His homilies set him apart in life from other religious figures because, in the
words of former PCES guerrilla and current professor Dagoberto Gutierrez, “he sided with the
weak and confronted the powerful,”87 and, as articulated by former ERP guerrilla and current
museum curator Carlos Henriquez Consalvi, because “when they heard him, they heard
themselves.” 88
Also, some interviewees such as former FPL guerrilla and current Minister of the Interior
Gerson Martínez consider that his speaking was one element among other symbolic gestures that
he made in order to take a stand against violence:
They’re killing his church, so he stops attending officer’s events as a sign of
mourning and starts being the voice of the people that lacked one. He then starts
writing poetry, and I say that in best way possible because most of Romero’s
homilies are the most beautiful and refined literature, really a thing of beauty.
They had increasing bravery and human sensibility. This was a Romero with great
fears, but when he spoke for the weak he was transformed, he became much
braver.89
His alliance with the poor, as demonstrated through his nationally broadcast homilies, was the
gesture that ensured Romero’s enduring place in the Salvadoran collective memory.
The importance of Romero’s voice is also highlighted by the fact that he was assassinated
mid-homily, and that the sharp-shooter’s bullet literally cut short the words of the Archbishop as
he prepared to administer the Eucharist. Interviewees repeatedly asserted that Romero’s death
was directly tied to his outspokenness, and that when his voice was censored, the conflict
escalated. The following quotes explain that Romero was targeted because he spoke in ways that
were deemed dangerous by the powerful sectors of Salvadoran society. Professor Dagoberto
Gutierrez, a former guerrilla, expressed this saying:
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When Monseñor Romero said in his last homily, ‘In the name of God, I ask of
you, I beg you, I order you; stop repressing, stop killing your brothers,’ it was a
message to the National Guard, the military and the repressive bodies. That was
the moment when the right wing of this country knew they had to kill him. 90
This was echoed by Eduardo Linares, former FPL guerrilla and current Director of the
Salvadoran State Intelligence Organization:
“He became a spokesman for the poor… So the [oligarchy] got confused. They thought
that by silencing Monseñor, people would stop rising up. But they were wrong. The
opposite happened.”91
Even some of those who do not speak favorably of Romero discuss him in terms of his
role as a spokesman. For instance Mauricio Vargas, a military officer who belongs to an
institution that does not generally uphold Romero as a positive symbol, said of him that,
“Monseñor was a pastor and we can see from his homilies that he preached what we call the
church’s social doctrine a lot. I don’t know if it was the right time or if the tone in which it was
delivered were correct, but what is clear is that it was the church’s social doctrine.”92 Despite
expressing his reservations about praising Romero, Vargas emphasizes his homilies and his
preaching as the key aspects of the archbishop’s role in the conflict.
I also interviewed Alfredo Mena Lagos, a conservative talk-show host and descendent of
the coffee-growing oligarchy who openly criticized the archbishop, saying that “Romero was a
guerrilla mouthpiece, he was their instrument… To be honest, I have very little respect for
Monseñor Romero. He distanced himself from his pastoral duties and got mixed up in politics,
he allowed himself to be used by the guerrillas.”93 Once again, despite his open distaste for
Romero, Mena Lagos refers to him as a “mouthpiece” and as an “instrument.” Though these
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terms are meant in a derogatory fashion, it is clear that it was Romero’s role as a speaker that
stood out in the minds of both his supporters and his critics.
The second clear trope that emerged from my research about Romero was his current
role as a transcendent moral guide for all Salvadorans. Though this is a narrative almost
exclusively promoted by the left-wing people I interviewed, and it is not one that is openly
supported by conservatives, the mythology of Romero as a universal Salvadoran conscience is
bolstered by the public ways his life and death are commemorated. Though the right-wing does
not necessarily support these celebrations of Romero, they do not challenge them, and through
their silence they are tacit to the promotion of his legacy.
In my interviews, the trope of a non-partisan moral guide was not expressed in one
unified way. However, the overall message is clear even when different words are used to
express similar ideas. For instance, Carlos Henriquez Consalvi, former FMLN guerrilla and
current director of the Museo de la Palabra y la Imagen (Museum of the Word and the Image),
describes that “[Romero] becomes a torch, a spiritual leader, to a big part of the country, most of
all the poorest and most ostracized… he increasingly continues to be a bastion of morality and
spirituality for our country.”94 This sentiment was reiterated by Violeta Menjívar, another former
guerrilla and current Vice-Minister of Health, saying, “we understand his actions as Christian,
ethical, religious, critical of the lack of democracy and the rampant violation of human rights.
He emerges as the… most emblematic figure of El Salvador.”95 A similar statement was given
by former guerrilla and current Director of the Salvadoran State Intelligence Service, Eduardo
Linares, who says that, “Monseñor Romero turns into the spiritual guide for all of us, even for
the guerrillas, without having been an FMLN commander, without belonging to any popular
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organizations. It’s because he was an ally of the poor.”96 These quotes give a dual definition to
Romero’s transcending leadership, as both a religious man and as a moral figure. These two
elements come together to construct him as El Salvador’s conscience who wrote and spoke a
truth thirty years ago that still resonates today.
Also, there repeatedly appeared clarifications that Romero’s convictions came from his
religious rather than political beliefs, especially among former and current members of the
FMLN. Violeta Menjívar (current Vice-Minister of Health) states the he acted “from his
religious perspective, not as a partisan person.”97 Professor Ricardo Ribera (exiled during the
war for his left-wing sympathies) says that he spoke out “not from a partisan perspective, but
rather based on the gospel.”98 Similarly, Professor Dagoberto Gutierrez (former member of the
FMLN and signer of the Peace Accords) argues that, “he is not a man with a left wing
history…He is a product of the people,”99 much in the same way as former guerrilla, signer of
the Peace Accords, and current moderate politician (member of the Social Democratic Party),
Ana Guadalupe Martínez, who says that “it’s not that he was a revolutionary; he was just the
leader of the church at the time of the peak of the conflict.”100 All of these demonstrate a clear
pattern of emphasizing that Romero was not allied with any particular group, and that his
teachings should be interpreted as universal, Christian messages, not as political statements.
I also found this to be true in one interview with a conservative, General Mauricio
Vargas, another signer of the Peace Accords, who described Romero saying,
His role was that of a pastor. I think in the moment there was not enough
understanding of the message that Monseñor Romero spoke. I don’t mind saying
today that there were also some who made use of his preaching, of his homilies to
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further their political perspectives… but this does not mean that he was a
Marxist… he just preached the church’s social doctrine.101
Though there are some Salvadorans such as conservative television host Alfredo Mena Lagos
who still vociferously claim that Romero is held up without merit, all of the rest of my
interviewees at least begrudgingly accepted the importance of his role as a speaker and the
impact on his death. Again, quoting from my interview with General Mauricio Vargas,
“[Romero]’s death was a very harsh blow because no one in their right mind could accept that
this could be done to someone in any society. I think that the brutal way in which he died was
not acceptable from any point of view.” In this sense, people across most of the political
spectrum speak to Romero’s key role in the conflict, and recognize his death as emblematic of
the extreme violence that reached its apex in the early 1980s.
This dual narrative of Romero as the voice of the voiceless, and as a non-partisan
moral/spiritual guide is not only spoken about, but is also activated through public acts and
spaces. Constructing Romero as a universal, unifying figure is a project that the FMLN is
actively engaged in through acts such as publicly commemorating his assassination, and building
structures in his honor. Though there are numerous examples of the ways and moments in which
Romero is remembered and invoked, here I will discuss the 2002 erection of a statue to the
archbishop, as well as his invocation by current president Mauricio Funes in his 2009
inauguration speech. And though perhaps ARENA, as a conservative party whose founder is
accused of ordering Romero’s assassination, may not join in actively celebrating him, their silent
allowance and acceptance of such acts renders them tacit in his promotion as a unifying national
figure.
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On March 24, 2002, exactly twenty-two years after Archbishop Romero’s assassination,
the Catholic church and the FMLN joined together to build a statue of him in the capital city.102
The monument, pictured in Figure 3.2, is a head-to-toe likeness of the cleric made of copper that
stands on a concrete pedestal reading,
¡Qué bien responden los pueblos cuando se les sabe amar!
-Monseñor Romero, 21 de enero 1980
XXII Aniversario de su Martirio, 1980-2002
San Salvador 24 de marzo del 2002
which can be loosely translated as “How well do the peoples of the world respond when they are
shown love!” It was built during Hector Silva’s time as mayor of San Salvador, the second in a
series of four FMLN mayors who held the position from 1994 to 2009.
However, the most important attribute of this statue is not its size or its inscription, which
promotes love and universal brotherhood. Rather, its location in the heart of San Salvador, at the
intersection of Boulevard Constitución and Alameda Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the shadow of
the Salvador del Mundo monument highlights the importance of this symbol. The centrality of
Romero’s statue, next to the city’s main plaza, reinforces the message that Romero belongs as a
centerpiece of Salvadoran history. The fact that the erection of this statue was allowed in such a
pivotal public space indicates his high degree of public acceptance as a national figure.
The Salvador del Mundo monument, a likeness of Christ standing atop the world, is the
most important national monument because it represents El Salvador as a nation.103 It is also
significant that Romero stands directly under the gaze of Christ, in a position that suggests his
symbolic status as a man near to God. Since Romero has been in consideration for full
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canonization by the Vatican since 2000,104 it makes sense that he would be placed in the position
of a saint, just beneath Christ. This reinforces the narrative of Romero as a universal, Christian,
moral guide, practically akin to Jesus himself. Equating Romero with Christianity also pressures
conservative sectors, which often define themselves as upholding Catholic values, to accept him
as a religious, rather than a politicized, figure.

Figure 3.2105
This narrative is further reinforced by those in the FMLN who invoke Romero during
political moments. One outstanding invocation occurred on June 1st, 2009, during the
presidential inauguration address of the FMLN’s Mauricio Funes. About half way through his
first speech to the nation as president, Funes stated that:
Our faith, our ethics, and our philosophy are not enough by themselves, they are
empty if we do not apply them concretely to the actions of our government. For
this reason, governing well is the maximum expression of commitment to our
people, and to the memory of Monseñor Oscar Arnulfo Romero, my teacher and
the spiritual guide of this nation. 106
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Here, Funes calls upon the narrative trope of Romero as a transcendent, universal moral leader,
on the grounds of his spiritual authority. Seeing such a reference in one of the most important
public declarations of 2009, without provoking significant backlash, is once again an indication
that Romero is in the process of being an acceptable historical reference, despite having been a
contested public figure.
Both the tropes of Romero as (a) the voice of the voiceless, and (b) as a transcendent
spiritual guide are perpetuated through narratives shared in private, such as my interviews, and
simultaneously promoted through articulations and actions that occur in the public sphere. Even
if it is principally the FMLN and their sympathizers who invoke Romero using these tropes, they
are increasingly joined by moderates such as General Mauricio Vargas, and supported by the
silence of the right-wing. There is not an active, widely accepted narrative that defends
Romero’s assassination, in comparison with the polarizing figures described in the previous
chapter. Most will at least admit that Romero’s killing was an excessive war-time atrocity.
Increasing numbers of young people are growing up surrounded by a positive image and
narrative of Romero. This portrayal of a godly man, shot down while speaking for the voiceless,
emphasizes the war as a moment of indefensible madness, recognized in hindsight as such with
Romero as the central martyr in this potentially unifying narrative.

Commander Schafik Jorge Handal
“Can Schafik become a great unifying myth? I think so.” –Prof. Ricardo Ribera
“He is a symbol that, like to or not, serves as a reference for new generations… he is a role
model.” -Gen. Mauricio Vargas
Schafik Jorge Handal was born to Palestinian immigrants in 1930, and began
participating in anti-dictatorial protests at the age of thirteen. He continued his role as an activist
throughout his time as a law student at the National University of El Salvador, as an advocate for
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increased university autonomy as well as constitutional reform. His vocal role in these activities
led to his expulsion from the country at the age of twenty-one, and when he returned five years
later, he ascended the ranks of the clandestine Communist Party (PCES) to become the Secretary
General in 1956. This led to his brief exile once more in 1960, and when he returned a few
months later, he resumed his activities as part of the PCES leadership. He was once again
selected as Secretary General in 1973, and he held that position throughout the conflict, until
1994.107
During the 1970s, the PCES split following disagreements between Handal and fellow
communist leader Salvador Cayetano Carpio over whether there were still non-violent avenues to
pursue in order to prevent a civil war, or whether the moment had arrived for an armed
revolution. Carpio’s strong belief in taking up arms in order to fight the state-sponsored
repression led him to form the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), and thus began the
fragmentation of the left that led to the eventual creation of the ERP, the PRTC, and the RN.108
Handal and the PCES continued to engage mainly in legal electoral and trade union organizing.
However, as the repression worsened and non-violent means of resistance did not yield results,
the PCES eventually joined the other four main guerrilla organizations in forming the FMLN,
though they were one of last factions to do so.109
During the conflict, each of the guerrilla organizations chose a leader to represent them in
the General Command. Handal served as the PCES General Commander throughout the war
under the nom de guerre Simón, alongside Salvador Sánchez Cerén (nom de guerre Leonel
González) of the FPL, Eduardo Sancho (nom de guerre Fermán Cienfuegos) of the RN,
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Francisco Jovel (nom de guerre Roberto Roca) of the PRTC, and René Cruz (nom de guerre
Joaquín Villalobos) of the ERP. 110 Of the five factions, the PCES was among the smallest, with
the ERP and the FPL leading in both numbers of supporters and in prominence because of their
military victories in the departments of Chalatenango and Morazán that gained “liberated
territories” for the guerrillas. The PCS fought primarily in the departments of San Salvador and
Cuscatlán.111
In the final months of 1989, the ARENA government of President Alfredo Cristiani and
the FMLN General Command independently sought the help of United Nations Secretary
General Javier Pérez de Céllar to find a resolution to the conflict.112 The negotiations resulted in
a series of accords between July 1990 and January 1992 that pieced together a framework for
ending the armed conflict and rebuilding a post-war El Salvador. Schafik Handal was one of the
leaders of the negotiation process, and signed each of the six different accords that were drafted
in those final eighteen months of the conflict. He was present throughout the negotiations,
played an active part in the dialogue, and is one of the sixteen signers of the final accord.113
In the 1990s, Handal served as the first General Coordinator of the FMLN, and oversaw
the transition of guerrilla organization into a political party.114 He then served as the
representative for the department of San Salvador115 to the National Legislative Assembly from
1997 until his death in 2006, during which time he continued to be a vocal advocate for the rights
of his poorest constituents. He was also opposed to many initiatives taken up by ARENA,
particularly the implementation of neo-liberal economic models that rewarded corporate
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investment,116 as well as the decision to support the United States by sending Salvadoran troops
to Iraq as part of operation “Iraqi Freedom.”117
In the final stage of his long political career, Handal ran for president in 2004. He lost to
his ARENA opponent, Tony Saca, a businessman, but won over 812,000 votes,118 an
unprecedented number of FMLN supporters in a country of fewer than 6 million people. In 2005
he was chosen by the FMLN to represent El Salvador in the first Central American Parliament
(PARLACEN).119 On January 24, 2006 Handal died of a heart-attack in the San Salvador airport
upon returning from the inauguration of Bolivian president Evo Morales. Today, his face adorns
FMLN banners, the party’s website, and the newly built monument in the suburb in Mejicanos.
With time, he has become the political face of the FMLN, and is invoked as a founding father.
Of the four figures discussed in this project, Handal is the most recently deceased, and
therefore his legacy and mythology have had the least time to ruminate. However, I was
surprised to find that my interviews yielded a generally unified narrative of who Handal was,
and what he means today. In fact, discussions of the commander were the most uniform of any
of the figures and centered around two aspects: firstly, interviewees described Handal’s role in
negotiating the peace process as crucial to reaching a resolution to the conflict, and secondly he
is considered by both his friends and adversaries to have been a consistent, honest and
respectable politician. Both of these aspects are tied to his commitment to democracy, which is
his outstanding hallmark and the root of his ability to be invoked, despite his contentious past, as
a unifying figure.
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Ten interviewees discussed Handal with me, and I have also incorporate quotes from
Gen. Orlando Zepeda’s book, Perfiles de la Guerra (Profiles of the War)120 and the military
history book En Defensa de la Patria (In Defense of the Fatherland)121 to show that these tropes
even appear in the most conservative of military histories. It is also important to note the
personal connections that several of the interviewees had with Handal. This is particularly true
in the case of four interviewees, General Mauricio Vargas, Ana Guadalupe Martínez, Nidia Diaz
and Dagoberto Gutierrez, who were all were fellow negotiators during of the peace process.
This undoubtedly affected the salience of Handal’s role as a negotiator in their minds, and may
have led to a disproportionate overrepresentation in my interview materials. I also conducted an
extensive interview with Handal’s son, legislative representative Jorge Schafik Handal Vega,
who is currently a leading FMLN politician and the party’s projected candidate for the 2012
mayorial race of San Salvador. His role in the party may also have an effect on his father’s
prominence as an icon.
The first narrative trope, Handal as a key negotiator, is articulated in the following quotes
by fellow members and sympathizers of the left. For instance, Carlos Henriquez Consalvi, a
former ERP guerrilla and current head of the Museum of the Word and the Image in San
Salvador described him, saying:
Schafik Handal is the protagonist of the peace process… He plays a very big role
in the negotiation process despite his very explosive demeanor. In politics, he
was a man that built a lot of bridges and negotiated with the right wing.”122
This was echoed by Gerson Martínez, a former FPL guerrilla and current Minister of the Interior
for the FMLN government of President Funes:
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That was Schafik [Handal], a man who sought a democratic means for change,
that’s how I see him… For the right wing the diplomatic option did not exist.
Schafik [Handal] is the one that supported dialogue the most; he was one of the
main intellectual elements in the design of the political solution of the conflict.123
These quotes highlight Handal’s leadership during the peace process, and how, out of all of the
accomplishments throughout his life, it was this role that was most historically outstanding.
Handal’s role as peacemaker and pursuer of democracy has come to be his superceding
identifying characteristic. Not only is his role as a negotiator considered his primary
accomplishment, these two quotes also indicate that, compared to the rest of those involved in
the reconciliation he was “the protagonist” and “the one that supported dialogue the most.” It has
become his supreme accomplishment in part because he is considered to have led the FMLN out
of the armed conflict.
Both Nidia Díaz, a former PRTC guerrilla and current Salvadoran representative of the
Central American Parliament (PARLACEN), and General Mauricio Vargas discussed Handal in
very personal terms, highlighting the extensive contact they had with him during the peace talks.
Díaz described his meticulous examination methods and fierce style of debate, saying:
Once I started working more directly in the peace negotiations… we practically
spent two years in direct contact, living in the same place. And his methods were
incredible; he was very diligent, not even a comma slipped by Schafik [Handal]
during the negotiations. He was so commited to protecting the interests of the
people. We saw his passionate determination not to give in, and his unwaivering
firmness in the face of the enemy. It was an incredible negotiation.124
Similarly, General Mauricio Vargas, who sat across the negotiating table from both Handal and
Díaz, described his impressions of Handal during the negotiations:
Schafik [Handal] played a very important leadership role. He was a very
charismatic person. Always defending what he really believed in… I got to really
talk to Schafik during the peace negotiations, it lasted 28 months and three days,
so I think I can speak to the way he was. He was a faithful believer and defended
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what was his, be it correct or incorrect, tooth and nail. He definitely played a
determinant role in the peace negotiations.125
The other two co-signers of the Peace Accord that I interviewed did not directly reference their
personal contact with Handal. However, they still considered his role in the negotiations to be a
key characteristic in their descriptions. Dagoberto Gutierrez, a fellow member of the PCES, and
current professor of Philosophy at the Lutheran University of El Salvador described him as,
…a man with a great sense of humor, a big joker, simple as that, even though he
had an angry face. He was much more than that, a declared communist, which in
this country was a thing of life and death… He had a very important role in
ending the Civil War via negotiations. He played an important part in forming
FMLN, he was a very efficient official and a good presidential candidate. 126
The most critical voice out of all my interviewees came from former ERP guerrilla Ana
Guadalupe Martínez. After the war, she left the FMLN and joined the Partido Demócrata
Cristiano (Democratic Christian Party or PDC), a party that was in power during the conflict,
after the 1984 elections when José Napoleón Duarte was elected president. However, most
analysts today consider those elections to have been largely discredited due to a widespread
boycott of the elections, as well as possible fraud. Throughout her interview, regardless of the
questions asked, Martínez turned the conversation around in order to repeatedly reference Duarte
as the father of democracy, and as a victim of history, unfairly preempted by Handal:
I think [Handal] is replacing Jose Napoleon Duarte who was the real icon of the
time, who truly represents the system’s reform, the struggle for democracy and
social justice… [Handal] never sought to raise awareness or provide structure or
leadership to the guerrilla. He was an important figure as head of the commission
that took part in the peace negotiations… even though I knew Schafik [Handal]
personally I think that the main figure for democratic foundation of the country
was Jose Napoleon Duarte.127
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Despite her overall critique of Handal as a leader both during and after the war, the only positive
thing she says about him concerns his role as a negotiator in the peace process. The reference to
Handal’s leadership during the negotiations continues to stand out as one key to understanding
his legacy. This can also be seen in the following quote from the military textbook In Defense of
the Fatherland (En Defensa de la Patria):
After the failure of the terrorist offensives of November 1989 and 1990… Handal
spearheaded a move towards dialogue in order to reach an accord, which would
allow a dignified end to the guerrilla misadventure. It was this process that
eventually yielded the Peace Agreements.128
Both of the latter two quotes are critical overall of either Handal specifically (Martínez) or of the
FMLN in general (the textbook). However, amidst these negative portrayals, both quotes cite
Handal’s status as “an important figure as the head of the commission that took part in the peace
negotiations” and as the leader willing to “spearhead” a “move towards dialogue in order to
reach an accord.” Handal is specifically identified with this moment of leadership that garnered
him respect from across the political spectrum, even from those with whom he had fundamental
ideological disagreements or who disliked him personally.
The second fundamental trope that is utilized in describing Schafik Handal is of his
consistency, perserverance and honesty as a politician in the post-war era. His son, FMLN
congressman Jorge Schafik Handal best sums up this sentiment:
Schafik [Handal] becomes what every leftist politician should be, honest, loyal to
his principles, consistent, perseverant, with integrity and confidence in the
people… He is very respected by his enemies.129
This was echoed by other members of the FMLN, such as former FPL guerrilla and
Minister of the Interior Gerson Martínez who stated that, “even people who didn’t completely
agree with his ideas have a great respect for him. I have great respect for him, most of all
128
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towards his perseverance.”130 Similarly, fellow peace negotiator and former PRTC guerrilla
Nidia Díaz expressed that, “I respected Schafik [Handal] very much, his courage to say things as
they were. If he said “no” it meant no, if he said “yes” he meant yes. And he contributed so
much to [the FMLN’s] beliefs, he was a great leader.”131 In addition to being respected for his
perserverance, Ricardo Ribera, professor of philosophy at the Universidad Centroamericana
commented that, “people say that [Handal] could have been mistaken, but not corrupt. He was
incorruptible.”132
These positive evaluations of character were also shared by his political and ideological
adversaries. The best example of this is the following quote from Alfredo Mena Lagos, a
conservative talk-show host and founding member of ARENA, who described Handal saying,
Schafik [Handal] rubbed me the right way. Even though I didn’t agree with him,
he was honest. I would always joke with him that he was ‘honestly mistaken.’
As someone who is proudly right-wing, I got along very well with him. He kept
his word, one could chat with him. Of course he was a product of his childhood
and his adolescence but he was a democratic leader who could have done a lot of
good.133
Similarly, General Mauricio Vargas, a fellow participant in the peace negotiations, said of
Handal that, “Schafik [Handal]… was the type of guy who defended what he believed in tooth
and nail. He never wavered on absolutely anything. He was a faithful believer in what was his,
right or wrong.”
If all of these quotes are considered together, a pattern emerges. Schafik Handal is
indeed respected by his opponents, and revered by his party. His reputation is that of as an
honest, straightforward, and perseverant person in a time when many prominent politicians of all
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parties are accused of corruption. Though this trope is not articulated in one consistent way, it is
still clear that Handal was known and respected for his conduct and character.
The two overarching narrative trends about Schafik Handal are his importance as a
negotiator during the time of the peace accords, and his stature as a respectable and honest
politician. As both of these are positive, it is not hard to understand why Handal would be
privately revered by those who knew him. However, the degree of prominence that Handal has
attained rivals only that of Farabundo Martí, the 1932 martyr and namesake of the FMLN party.
For instance, Handal’s face is used in much official FMLN propaganda and publications,
including the main page of the party’s website, where he appears alongside Martí (depicted in
Figure 3.4). Also, the party inaugurated a monument in his honor, in San Salvador, on the 24th
of January of 2011, on the fifth anniversary of his death, shown in Figure 3.5. These are just two
examples of the many ways that Handal is invoked by the FMLN, but they are some of the most
prominent, and very publicly link Handal with the party that he helped to found.

Figure 3.4134
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Screen shot of the official FMLN website, http://www.fmln.org.sv, April 14, 2011. Handal is featured in the
permanent banner at the top of the page, with 1932 leader Farabundo Martí to his right.
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The use of Handal’s likeness on the FMLN website shows his increased invocation as a
unifying symbol within the party, though not necessarily beyond. However, this is important
because the FMLN has been historically fragmented, in particular after the war officially ended
and there was much disagreement about the course that the FMLN should take as a political
party rather than a guerrilla organization. Though the various factions that made up the FMLN
during the conflict have officially been dissolved, the fragmentation remains present. Therefore,
Handal’s rise as a symbolic head of the party is particularly fascinating because of his leadership
role within the PCES.
While some question why Handal would be chosen as the new face of the FMLN when
he was not the most prominent figure during the war, Professor Ricardo Ribera of the UCA
offers a logical explanation:
Death allows for this kind of myth to grow and it’s pretty clear that at [the] moment [of
his death] the FMLN needed a myth, an icon… it was pretty wise of him to die with such
good timing, he had just been defeated in the elections; he was a founder of the party but
he didn’t lead any of the main factions… what merits did he have? His ideological
consistency, more so than any of the others in the General Command… I think that the
left, as a democratic left rather than a revolutionary left, needs a figure like him.135
It is true that Handal is the first of the five members who made up the FMLN General Command
during the war to pass away, and perhaps if another leader of equal prominence had died first,
Handal’s role may have been filled by someone else. However, the myth of Schafik Handal is
special because it can be framed as one that celebrates both peace and democracy, through the
tropes of his role as a negotiator and as an honest politician. The FMLN as a political party
would like to associate itself with both peace and democracy in the minds of voters, because
these are two powerful ideas that have the capacity to bridge a divided society. For this reason,
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the FMLN invests in the long-term preservation of Handal’s memory, as demonstrated in the
recently erected monument in his honor.

Figure 3.5136
This monument, built just outside of San Salvador in the suburb of Majicanos to
commemorate the fifth year anniversary of Handal’s death, has three important parts: the central
pillar topped with the FMLN’s signature star; the likeness of Handal etched into the block on the
pillar’s left; and a quotation of Handal’s on to the right that reads, “El Salvador should be a
country worth living in, where all of us can have the opportunity to work, to see our children
grow, to pursue progress, and to live securely and with DIGNITY.” These three aspects highlight
Handal as a figure primarily associated with the FMLN, but who holds universal values about
human dignity. As in the case of Archbishop Romero’s monument, the ability for this project to
go forward , especially so soon after Handal’s death, is an indication of a general level of
acceptance of Handal as an important historical figure.
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Design of the monument to Handal, inaugurated on January 24, 2011 on the fifth anniversary of his death. Image
from http://www.fmln.org.sv.
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In conclusion, my supplemented interview data revealed unified narratives, or consistent
ways of describing and interpreting Archbishop Oscar Romero and Commander Schafik Handal.
Romero is commonly hailed as the voice of the voiceless, and as a universal moral and spiritual
guide. Handal is discussed largely in terms of his role as a negotiator during the peace process,
and as an honest and perseverant politician. All of these narrative trends are generally centered
around positive attributes that can be palatable to people from across the political spectrum. For
instance, by speaking out for the voiceless, Romero stands for bravery and justice, as well as
being upheld as a righteous man because of his position in the church when he was assassinated.
On the other hand, Handal represents a desire for peace through his role in the negotiations, as
well as the ideal politician who is both firm in his beliefs and conducts himself honestly. Though
there are undoubtedly those who criticize the rising prominence of both of these men, the ways
they are invoked in public rhetoric and in public spaces demonstrates their continually expanding
acceptance as historically important Salvadorans. Despite the fact that both of these figures are
openly promoted more so by the political left than by the right, their growing acceptance
indicates their potential to become increasingly unifying, as future generations who have not
experienced the war internalize narratives about these figures such as the ones described in this
chapter.
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Conclusion
The four case studies discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 illustrate the special and
complex results that a negotiated peace process can have on historical memory. In the post-war
era, some historical figures, such as Colonel Monterrosa and Major d’Aubuisson are understood
in competing, contradictory and polarizing ways. For instance, both of these figures are
remembered by the right as heroes who fought to contain communist aggression, while the left
considers them to be among the worst abusers of human rights during the war. Those figures that
are divisive are remembered by some for their particular abilities, but tend to be tied to some
war-time event or atrocity that cannot be denied or forgotten by their enemies. Thus, the
competing narratives cannot be reconciled.
Others, such as Archbishop Romero and Commander Handal are emerging as figures
who are understood in a more unified manner that can foster reconciliation. Romero is
remembered as the voice of the voiceless, and as the nation’s transcendent spiritual guide;
Handal is lifted up as a protagonist of the peace process, and a model politician. Unifying
figures are primarily remembered for their merits, which tend to be correlated with post-war
values such as peace, democracy, and human rights. For instance both Romero and Handal are
invoked as representations of the progress El Salvador has made since the 1980s and heralded as
exemplary national icons.
In conclusion, the decision to incorporate all of the main warring factions into civil
society has led to two main benefits: firstly, institutions such as political parties, the military,
and the Catholic church are allowed to celebrate and perpetuate their own narratives of history
without fearing state-sanctioned retribution. Each of the four figures discussed in previous
chapters is upheld by his respective institution (and sometime by more than one, as in the case of
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Archbishop Romero who is celebrated by both the church and the FMLN). Whether these
narratives are unifying or polarizing, the ability for them to be expressed, written, and
transmitted freely is a remarkable change from the way things were before the war. Secondly, a
unifying reconciliation narrative is being constructed by a variety of institutions, rather than
being controlled or imposed solely by the state. The involvement of multiple groups that
represent the interests and voices of various sectors of society could eventually lead to a more
inclusive understanding of the conflict that represents multiple experiences and perspectives,
though a unified version of history is far from being a reality in El Salvador.
In future research, I hope to explore what other tropes and historical events are helping to
foster national reconciliation and healing, for instance the narrative of democracy as a unifying
national value, and the negotiations at the end of the war as a moment that symbolizes the
beginning of peace. Though I saw evidence of both of these narrative tropes in my research,
their inclusion would have gone beyond the scope of this project. The four case studies
described here provide a glimpse into the processes occurring in El Salvador today to make sense
of and remember some of the most difficult times in this small nation’s history.
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Appendix (a)
Acronym Directory
ARENA: Alianza Republicana Nacionalist de El Salvador.
Republican Nationalist Alliance of El Salvador. ARENA is the main conservative
political party founded by Roberto d’Aubuisson in 1981. The party held the presidential
office from 1989-2009.
FMLN: Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional.
The Farbundo Martí Front for National Liberation. The FMLN was originally a guerrilla
organization formed in 1980. It was composed of the ERP, FPL, PRTC, RN, and PCES
factions. The FMLN became a political party in 1992 following the Peace Accords. In
2009, Mauricio Funes became the first FMLN candidate to win the presidency.
PCES: Partido Comunista de El Salvador
Communist Party of El Salvador
ERP: Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo
The People’s Revolutionary Army
FPL: Fuerzas Populares de Liberación
Popular Forces of Liberation
PRTC: Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centroamericanos
Revolutionary Party of Central-American Workers
RN: Resistencia Nacional
National Resistance
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Appendix (b)
List of Interviewees
Violeta Menjivar (Interviewed August 8, 2010).
- Former member of the FPL.
- Provided medical care on the field.
- Former diputada (congressional representative).
- Current vice-minister of health.
Carlos Henriquez Consalvi (Interviewed July 19, 2010).
- Venezuelan left-wing sympathizer who went to El Salvador in 1979 to make a
documentary, and joined the guerrilla movement for the remained of the war.
- Former member of the ERP.
- Founder and director of Radio Venceremos (Radio We Shall Be Victorious).
- Founder and curator of El Museo de la Palabra y la Imagen (The Museum of the Word
and the Image).
General Mauricio (Chato) Vargas (Interviewed July 19, 2010).
- Military officer.
- Participated in the peace talks and signed the Peace Accords.
Alfredo Mena Lagos (August 12, 2010).
- Founder of the Nationalist Party of El Salvador, which later was incorporated into
ARENA.
- Descendant of landed oligarchy, today still owns coffee plantations.
- Lived in the US for 18 years.
- Host of the conservative radio and television program, Pensando en Voz Alta (thinking
out loud).
Dagoberto Gutierrez (July 19, 2010).
- Former member of the PCES.
- Participated in the peace talks and signed the Peace Accords.
- Current vice-rector at the Lutheran University of El Salvador.
Zoila Milagro Navas (July 26, 2010).
- Has been the mayor of Antiguo Cusctlán, a wealthy suburb of San Salvador, for more
than twenty years.
- A close personal friend of Roberto d’Aubuisson
Ana Guadalupe Martínez (July 21, 2010).
- Part of the ERP leadership during the war.
- After the war, broke with the FMLN
- Became a diputada (legislator) for the Partído Demócrata Cristiano, a party formed in the
late 1960’s and who were disenfranchised in the 1972 elections. Their leader, Napoleón
Duarte was part of the 1979 junta that took power of the country, and he was elected
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president (1984-1989). Today the PDC is one of the smaller political parties who
participate mostly at a local and legislative level.
Gerson Martínez (July 21, 2010).
- Founding member of the FPL
- Currently Minister of Public Works
Jorge Schafik Handal Vega (July 19, 2010).
- Son of Schafik
- Now a diputado for the department of Usulután
Ricardo Ribera (August 9, 2010).
- Professor of Philosophy and Sociology at the Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón
Cañas (UCA).
Nidia Díaz (August 11, 2010).
- Former PRTC guerrilla.
- Author of the internationally successful memoir I was Never Alone about her experience
as a prisoner of war.
- Participant in the peace talks, and signer of the Peace Accord.
- Current member of the Cenral American Parlament (PARLACEN).
Eduardo Linares (July 26, 2010).
- Former FPL guerrilla.
- Current director of the Salvadoran State Intelligence Organization.
Ronaldo Cáceres (July 30, 2010).
- Former ERP guerrilla.
- Founder and curator of the Museo de la Revolución in Perquín, Morazán.
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